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Aviation Litigation: Federal Preemption and the
Creation of a Federal Remedy as a Means to
Extinguish the Current Confusion in the Courts
I. INTRODUCTION
Air disasters, whether collisions mid-air or on the ground, are
the subject of massive litigation.' When an air crash occurs, two
responsibilities arise: determining the probable cause of the
crash so that other pilots can be warned against duplicating the
same action, and compensating the victims to the extent the law
is able. One of the principle complexities in lawsuits that result
from the crash of a public carrier exists due to the different state
citizenships of the passengers involved and the conflicting state
laws. Although there has been an effort to minimize the impact of
state lines on the rights of interstate travelers,2 one right that has
escaped this effort is the right to receive damages in the event of
death.3
The following scenerio is easily imaginable. A federal court sit-
ting in State A, following the crash of a plane in State A which
had departed from State B, could decide that some of the occu-
pants were entitled to whatever damages State B would allow,
others would be permitted whatever State A law would allow, and
still others, who had boarded the flight in State C and only con-
1. For an illustrative list of litigation, see note 12 infra.
2. The following provision is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976):
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact
are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to
any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict
litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that
transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties
and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such
actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel
at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district
from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously
terminated: Provided, however, That the panel may separate any
claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand
any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded.
Id.
3. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. 1506 (1976).
nected through State B, might be permitted to recover whatever
State C would allow.
In some states, a human life is worth a few thousand dollars, 4
while in others it can be worth millions,5 depending on the iden-
tity and domicile of the decedent. Naturally, every wrongful
death litigant wishes to take, advantage of the law most favorable
to him or her. This leads to a great deal of forum shopping.6
Because of these conflicts between the various state laws, a
mistake in seeking the proper jurisdiction could result in a loss to
a client of hundreds of thousands of dollars, caused simply by try-
ing a case in a jurisdiction subject to a limitation which could
have been avoided if proper legal steps had been taken. The hor-
rible irony is that one's recovery may be affected because one's
husband, wife, father, or mother happened to be a domiciliary in
one state and not another. There is little justice in this.
This comment will discuss the need for providing exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction in the area of aviation litigation. The issue of
whether an overriding federal interest in air commerce exists to
preempt state tort law and to support the establishment of a fed-
eral tort cause of action accompanied by a federal remedy will
also be addressed. In conclusion, a recommendation of how to
implement the above concepts to eliminate the current injustices
inherent in this area of litigation will be set forth in detail.
II. NEED FOR PROVIDING EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Ordinarily, in the wake of a single air disaster, multiple suits
will be brought in different jurisdictions due to diversity of citi-
zenship between the carrier or manufacturer and the passengers,
who are residents of several states. 7 A defendant being sued by
numerous plaintiffs in federal district courts will normally be able
4. 2 J. KENNELLY, LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES, ch. 6 (Ist ed.
1968). Example of states limiting recovery for wrongful death includes: Colorado,
$35,000; Kansas, $35,000.
5. In states which have not enacted recovery limitations, a plaintiff can liter-
ally be awarded whatever dollar figure the judge or jury deems proper under the
particular circumstances. Two states with no restriction on recovery in death ac-
tions are Texas (Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968))
and California (Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 106 (1974)).
6. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) states: "Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case is the law of the State." See also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (in diversity of citizenship cases involving questions of
conflicts of laws, federal courts must follow rules prevailing in states in which they
sit).
7. In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
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to remove to the federal court any state court action arising out of
the same crash, by use of the federal removal statute.8 For these
reasons, aircraft litigation results in the use of federal "multidis-
trict litigation." Such cases are assigned and transferred by a Ju-
dicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.9 The Judicial Panel,
established in section 1407(a)10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, attempts to discourage trying the same case a number of
times, by allowing the lawsuits to be consolidated before a single
court which has the power to "coordinat[e] or consolidatfe] pre-
trial proceedings."'" The advantages of a single forum include
centrally controlled discovery procedures,12 expedition of settle-
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citi-
zens or subjects thereof are additional parties.
Id.
8. In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant
or defendants, to the district court of the United States for the dis-
trict and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
Id.
9. Details of the Judicial Panel's procedures are set forth in Speiser, Dynam-
ics of Airline Crash Litigation What Makes the Cases Move? 43 H. Am L. & COM.
565 (1977).
10. See note 2 supra.
11. Id.
12. The following citations are to reported decisions of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation consolidating state actions: In re Air Disaster at Denver,
Colorado, on November 16, 1976, 486 F. Supp. 241 (J.P.M.D.L. 1980); In re Air Crash
Near Van Cleve, Mississippi, on August 13, 1977, 486 F. Supp. 926 (J.P.M.D.L. 1980);
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979, 476 F. Supp. 445
(J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In re Aircraft Accident at Barrow, Alaska, on October 13, 1978,
474 F. Supp. 996 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Interna-
tional Airport in Denver, Colorado, on August 7, 1975, 447 F. Supp. 1071 (J.P.M.D.L.
1978); In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy International Airport on June
24, 1975, 407 F. Supp. 244 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976); In re Air Crash Disaster at Charlotte,
North Carolina, on September 11, 1974, 393 F. Supp. 1404 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975); In re
Air Crash at Chattanooga, Tennessee, on November 27, 1973, 393 F. Supp. 1406
(J.P.M.D.L. 1975); In re Delta Airlines Crash at Boston, Massachusetts, on July 13,
1973, 373 F. Supp. 1406 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974); In re Delta Airlines Crash at Boston, Mas-
sachusetts, on July 13, 1973, 373 F. Supp. 1406 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974); Florida Everglades
Crash of December 29, 1972, 360 F. Supp. 1394 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973), 368 F. Supp. 812
(J.P.M.D.L. 1973); Juneau, Alaska, Crash of September 4, 1971, 350 F. Supp. 1163
(J.P.M.D.L. 1972), 360 F. Supp. 1406 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973); Duarte, California, Crash of
June 6, 1971, 346 F. Supp. 529 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972), 354 F. Supp. 278 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973);
ments,13 and elimination of duplicated efforts and expenditures
by courts and litigants.14
The presence of the Judicial Panel and its exercised authority 5
would tend to persuade one to believe that exclusive federal juris-
diction of airline crash actions has already been mandated. How-
ever, two impediments exist which prohibit, or at least hinder,
consolidation. For example, if a crash involves parties with a
common state of residence, the Judicial Panel will not remove the
case to a federal court. Thus, the first impediment is the exist-
ence of purely state actions. The second is that the federal re-
moval statute' 6 itself requires that all transferred cases be
returned to the original federal district court after completion of
trial-type procedures such as pretrial pleadings, law in motion
and discovery.'T Further, the statute expressly bars a district
court from taking jurisdiction of such cases for trial.
Courts have recognized the convenience and economy of trans-
fers for many purposes and have attempted to circumvent the re-
mand requirement of the Multidistrict Litigation Statute.i8 If a
uniform federal law is adopted, reason will exist to resolve cases
from a single air crash in a common forum, thereby avoiding re-
moval to a federal court to determine pre-trial procedural issues
and returning the case to a state court for trial. The federal law
Las Vegas, Nevada, Crash of October 8, 1968, 336 F. Supp. 414 (J.P.M.D.L 1972);
Dayton, Ohio, Crash of March 9, 1967, 310 F. Supp. 798 (J.P.M.D.L. 1970); Hong
Kong Crash of June 30, 1967, 298 F. Supp. 390 (J.P.M.D.L. 1969). See generally Mar-
tin, Multidistrict Litigation-A Panacea or a Blight, 18 T iAI LAw. Gum 409
(1974).
An example of the positive results brought about by 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976) is the
litigation resulting from the Duarte air disaster in which 49 persons were killed.
Approximately 145 claims were represented in the case; all actions were trans-
ferred under the multidistrict litigation statute. Although discovery involved dep-
ositions exceeding a total of 6,500 pages, coordinated procedures resulted in
settlement on the issue of liability less than two years after the accident. All
claims were settled with total recovery of about $10 million. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 1-2, 17, Wilkerson v. Hughes Air Corp., MDL No. 106, Civil
No. 72-459-PH (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 1974). The case is reported in Duarte, California,
Crash of June 6, 1971, 346 F. Supp. 529 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972), Gabel v. Hughes Air
Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972), and In re Air Crash Near Duarte, Califor-
nia on June 6, 1971, 357 F. Supp. 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
13. Id. Specifically see Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 612; Duarte, 357 F. Supp. 1013.
14. Id.
15. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 8 and 10 supra.
17. See generally Martin, Multidistrict Litigation-A Panacea or a Blight, 18
TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 409 (1974). See also note 12 supra.
18. See note 9 supra. See also In re Mid Air Crash Collision Near Fairland,
Indiana, 309 F. Supp. 621 (J.P.M.D.L 1970). The court avoided the remand require-
ment by transferring and consolidating an air crash trial for all purposes and as a
result a change of venue was declared. See also note 20 infra.
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will apply to every case regardless of where it is filed. 19
m. THE BURDENING ASPECT OF CONFLICTS OF LAW
Developing an exclusive federal jurisdiction would not end the
confusion which is inherent in air crash litigation. When cases in-
volving multi-state interests are transferred to a single federal
district, each case brings with it its own state's substantive laws
and conflict of laws choices because change of venue is merely a
change in courtrooms.20 The true confusion begins when the con-
flict of laws rules for the various states are analyzed.
A variety of approaches are used to determine the applicability
of a state's choice of law rule2l when faced with a competing
choice of law rule from another state that is involved in the same
litigation. Traditionally, virtually all states adhered to the doc-
trine known as lex loci delecti when confronted with a conflict of
laws issue involving a tort.22 The doctrine requires that the sub-
stantive law of the place of the wrong be applied to the case. The
doctrine received grave criticism in that the place where a crash
occurs depends on uncontrollable factors, such as the place where
trouble first begins 23 or the angle of the descent of the aircraft. 24
19. See text accompanying notes 34-114 infra.
20. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Defendants sought to transfer
all actions to Massachusetts under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), hoping to take advantage of
the limited liability of that state's wrongful death statute. The case was ultimately
decided by the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Goldberg concluding.
[I]n cases such as the present, where the defendants seek transfer, the
transferee district court must be obligated to apply the state law that
would have been applied if there had been no change of venue. A change
of venue under § 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state law,
but a change of courtrooms.
376 U.S. at 639. The Court was concerned only with those state laws of the trans-
feror state which would significantly affect the outcome of the case. See also
Klaxton Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). When jurisdic-
tion of a court is based on diversity of citizenship, the choice of law rules of the
state where the action was originally filed must be applied.
21. In the area of conflict of laws, the choice of law rule is the question
presented in determining what law should govern. This determination can involve
determining whether to apply the law of a sister state, when a federal court of the
United States apply state law, or when a state court must apply federal law. S.
CRAMTON, D. CURIEu & H. KAY, CONFUCT OF LAWS CASES COMMENTS QUESTIONS 1-7
(2d ed. 1975).22. Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892)
(negligence action by an employee injured in a state other than his place of domi-
cile); RESTATEMENT OF CONFUCTS OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
23. Note, Limitation of Liability in Death Actions is Procedural-Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 74 HA~v. L REV. 1652, 1654 (1961).
Lex loci delecti was slowly replaced by more flexible and ra-
tional approaches. One such approach is known as the "center of
gravity" approach.25 The courts, instead of treating the place of
the wrong as determinative, lay emphasis upon the law of the
state which has the most significant contacts with the matter in
dispute. All of the relevant contacts are considered and the law of
the state having the most dominant relation to the case is
applied.26
Another approach developed by the courts was the "govern-
ment policy interest analysis"27 approach. This approach requires
a court to determine the relevant policies of each state, identify
the interests each state has in having its law, as compared to that
of another state, applied to the issues in dispute under the facts
of the case, evaluate the competing interests of the states, and ap-
ply the most appropriate state law under the circumstances. 28
24. Id. Little regard was given to the public policies of the involved states or
the interests of the states. Kilberg v. Northeastern Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172
N.E.2d 526 (1961). The limiting lex loci delecti is being widely displaced, at least to
protect the citizens of the forum state against application of the varying laws of
other states through or over which they move. Id.
25. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). The defendant husband,
a British citizen, entered into a New York marital separation agreement with his
wife, plaintiff, wherein she was to remain in England while he resided in New
York. When the husband discontinued payments, the wife brought suit in a New
York court. The court held that it could take into account the interests of the
other jurisdiction and apply the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant
contacts in the dispute. English law was found to be applicable as to the perform-
ance which the court found to be the essence of the marital agreement, since the
performance was to be rendered by the wife in England. See also Rubin v. Irving
Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 305, 113 N.E.2d 424, 431 (1953) (involved an oral agreement
not to revoke or alter wills); Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961) (conflict of laws problem over a child support payment).
26. Id.
27. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963)
(New York Court of Appeals applied New York common law, although Ontario,
the site of the accident, had a guest statute, because of the predominant concern
of New York with an action involving injuries sustained by a New York guest as a
result of the negligence of a New York host operating an auto garaged and li-
censed in New York). See, e.g., Storie v. Southfield Leasing, Inc., 90 Mich. App.
612, 282 N.W.2d 417 (1979) (foreign law will not be recognized if contrary to the
public policy of the forum); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402 Mich. 234, 262 N.W.2d 625
(1978) (lex loci delicti frustrates public policy of one state's exception to parental
immunity); Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969)
(tort action arising from an out of state auto accident).
28. Id. While contacts are significant they must be weighed and not merely
counted. Three factors which may be significant for this purpose are: (1) the
domicile, nationality, residency, or place of business of the plaintiff and defendant,
(2) the place of the wrong, and (3) the forum itself. See generally B. CURRIE, SE-
LECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAw, 690-742 (1st ed. 1963).
Closely related to the interest analysis approach is that followed in the Califor-
nia courts known as "comparative impairment." Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16
Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976). The court determines which
state's policy would be more severely affected if it were not applied. An example
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A fifth approach 29 followed by numerous state courts is one
known as "the most significant relationship" approach.3 0 The
most comprehensive technique under this approach is, first, to
weigh the competing state interests by identifying the contacts
with each state and assess their importance by evaluating their
relationship to the state policy involved, and, second, to resolve
the issue by applying the law of the state determined to have the
most significant interest.3 1
of the application of this approach can be found in Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11
Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974), wherein Hurtado, a California
resident, was a defendant in a wrongful death action brought by a resident of Mex-
ico. California had no limit to damages recoverable for wrongful death while Mex-
ico limited recovery to a maximum of $1,946.72. The trial court applied the law of
California after determining California had the greater interest in the case. The
Supreme Court of California affirmed after analyzing the issues and relevant inter-
ests. It concluded that the interest for limiting damages is to avoid financial bur-
dens on the residents of Mexico. Here the defendants were Californians, therefore
Mexico had no interest in applying its limitation. On the other hand, California
did have an interest as to the defendants in order to deter their conduct.
29. For a discussion on various other approaches followed by a few various
states see Kuhn, Choice of Law in Products Liability, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1972).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6 (1971). Section 6 states:
Choice-of-Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statu-
tory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice
of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.
Id.
See also Wood Bros. Home Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 198 Colo. 444, 601
P.2d 1369 (1979) (once the state having the most significant relationship to particu-
lar issue is identified under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145,
the law of that state is applied to resolve the particular issue); Ingersoll v. Klein,
46 Ill. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970) (Constitution does not require a court to apply
doctrine of lex loci delicti rather than the "most significant contacts rule" in deter-
mining applicable law).
31. This is the approach adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 145 (1971). In tort cases:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in
tort are to be determined by the local law of the state which, with respect
to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties under the principles stated in section 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of sec-
tion 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
While the modern approaches to the various conflict of laws sit-
uations may be reasonable and efficient in a single case, they can
flood courts with numerous conflicts in air crash litigation. For
example, consider the recent litigation over claims for punitive
damages in consolidated actions for wrongful death in connection
with a fatal air crash in Illinois.32 There, the court had to deter-
mine the liability of the defendants in a consolidated action for
wrongful deaths by applying the particular conflict of laws rule
used by the states where each of the respective claims were
originally filed. In the end, some plaintiffs were entitled to puni-
tive damages from one defendant but not the other.33
The conclusion to be drawn is that it is a fiction to believe that a
judge can operate effectively when required to apply different
conflict of laws rules to various claims arising from one single ac-
cident. The inevitable differences in the outcomes on identical is-
sues are far from equitable when one considers that variations in
liability and damages, though based on identical conduct, are due
to differences in state conflict of laws principles and underlying
tort law.
IV. PROPOSAL I: ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERAL TORT CAUSE OF
ACTION ACCOMPANIED BY A FEDERAL REMEDY
To date, it remains clear that courts have not been able to deal
equitably with the adverse consequences caused by conflicts of
laws in air crash litigation. The issue has yet to be settled as to
whether an overriding federal interest exists in air commerce suf-
ficient to preempt state tort law and to impose federal common
law in order to eliminate inconsistent results due to the applica-
tion of conflicting state choice of law rules.
The most direct way to correct this' incongruity in aviation
law is by Congressional action. Presently, airlines are subject to
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and
place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue.
Id.
32. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979, 500 F.
Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1980). The variety of state wrongful death statutes presented
the greatest source of conflict in this air crash litigation. Actions were filed m Ii-
nois, which applies "the most significant relationship" test, California, where the
"comparative impairment" approach is followed, Michigan and New York, where
the "government interest analysis" approach is applied, and in Puerto Rico and
Hawaii, which the court held applied the "lex loci delicti" test.
33. Id. at 1054.
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uniform federal regulation in almost every aspect of their opera-
tions.34 The Federal Aviation Act of 195835 established exclusive
federal control over the nation's navigable airways and at the
same time gave authority to the Federal Aviation Administrator
to develop aviation commerce and to establish the standards nec-
essary to ensure aviation safety.36 Additional evidence of federal
interests preempting those of states can be found in various sen-
ate bills introduced to the 90th and 91st Congress which would
have provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain tort
actions arising in the course of aviation commerce.37 However,
these bills were never passed.38
Unfortunately, Congress has failed to readdress the conflict of
34. 72 Stat. 731 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976)). Section 1508(a) provides
specifically:
The United States of America is declared to possess and exercise com-
plete and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace of the United
States, including the airspace above all inland waters and the airspace
above those portions of the adjacent marginal high seas, bays, and lakes,
over which by international law or treaty or convention the United States
exercises national jurisdiction.
Id.
35. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976).
36. The objective of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is to foster the develop-
ment of aviation commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976). For examples of primary fed-
eral authority in aviation, see Air Line Pilots Assoc. Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892
(2d Cir. 1960) (age limitations for airmen); United States v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp.
151 (D. Nev. 1944) (airworthiness and pilot certificates); Rosenhan v. United
States, 131 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942) (airworthiness certificates for aircraft). See
generally Comment, State Versus Federal Regulation of Commercial Aeronautics,
39 Am L. & COM. 521 (1973).
37. The "Holtzoff Bill", introduced into the Senate in 1968, provided for exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction over civil actions arising out of the operation of aircraft. S.
3305, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1968). As a result of opposition, the "Admiralty Bill"
patterned after the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-62 (1976) was in-
troduced, and provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over any action for dam-
ages from injury or death for any breach of duty arising in the course of aviation
activity. Hearings on S. 3305 and S. 3306, Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-
32 (1968). In particular, the proposal by Senator Joseph Tydings urged that exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction be granted only to those cases involving substantial num-
bers of people and suits in multiple jurisdictions. Hearings on S. 961 Before the
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Under the bill, "there exists a uniform
body of federal law governing all civil relations arising out of air craft litigation."
Id. However, the substantive rules of law were to be left to be shaped by judicial
decisions.
38. The criticism by opponents to the proposed bill amounted to the objection
that such an establishment of a federal uniform law would invade local definitions
of tort law which had been traditionally based on community standards and state
policies.
laws issue which is arguably entwined with the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958. Rather than define a distinct remedial status for avia-
tion wrongful death and personal injury cases, Congress appears
to have deferred to the law of the interested state. In the case of
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. ,39 the Supreme
Court took some steps to resolve this issue. The majority held
that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 preempted the field of air
safety.40 It was confirmed that the Act was "intended to consoli-
date in one agency under the Executive Branch the control over
aviation that had previously been diffused within that branch.
The paramount substantive concerns of Congress were to regu-
late federally all aspects of air safety. ... 41 It follows that if the
federal policy of uniform control over aviation conflicts with com-
peting state tort laws, the federal supremacy clause provides the
choice of law answer.42 In addition, recent lower federal court de-
cisions have successfully found alternatives which provide a fed-
eral remedy where none is expressly provided for by the statute.
In the landmark case of Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. ,43 fed-
eral aviation common law achieved full recognition by the sev-
enth circuit. The court held that federal common law which
favors recovery preempted contrary Indiana law as to indemnity
39. 411 U.S. 624 (1973). The Supreme Court upheld the invalidation of a city
noise ordinance which prohibited jet take-off from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport
during certain prescribed hours.
40. Id. at 633. Also, the United States Supreme Court has upheld legislation
which displaced the state tort remedies where the federal policy required national
conformity under federal remedies. See, e.g., New York Central R.R. Co. v. Win-
field, 244 U.S. 147 (1917) (liabilities and obligations of interstate railroad compa-
nies is regulated inclusively and exclusively by the Federal Employers Liability
Act). See also Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) (the
Boiler Inspection Act precludes state legislation).
41. 411 U.S. at 644 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. Federal preemption implies more than extensive administrative regula-
tion. U.S. Const. art. VI cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. See also Chicago, 500 F. Supp. at 1054.
43. 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974). The case arose out of a mid-air collision be-
tween a general aircraft and a commercial airliner near Fairland, Indiana. Eighty-
three persons were killed. After more than 80 actions were filed in numerous fed-
eral district courts, the Multidistrict Litigation Panel transferred them to the
Southern District of Indiana pursuant to the Multidistrict Litigation Statute. In re
Mid-Air Collision Near Fairland, Indiana, 309 F. Supp. 621 (J.P.M.D.L. 1970). A dis-
pute arose as to whether Allegaheny and the United States could maintain third
party actions for contribution and indemnity on the assertion of contributory neg-
ligence on the part of the manufacturer of the Piper Cherokee aircraft. The dis-
trict court dismissed on the grounds that Indiana law did not allow such recovery
between tortfeasors upon which defendants appealed and ultimately prevailed.
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and contribution for damages paid as a result of a collision be-
tween an interstate commercial airliner and a local private plane.
The court based its decision on "the predominant, indeed almost
exclusive, interest of the federal government in regulating the af-
fairs of the nation's airways" and promoting uniformity of deci-
sions. 4 The source of this predominant federal action is the
Federal Aviation Act of 195845 which declares that the United
States possesses "exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace
of the United States"40 in order, the court said, "to create one uni-
fied system of flight rules and to centralize in the... Federal Avi-
ation Administration the power to promulgate rules for the safe
and efficient use of the country's airspace."47
In Kohr, the court did not limit the use of federal common law
to governmental claims only. "The interest of the state wherein
the fortuitous event of the collision occurred," the court con-
cluded, "is slight as compared to the dominant federal interest."48
The hypothesis that a federal right requires a federal remedy is
not unique to the courts of the United States. The most important
case recognizing a federal remedy is Moragne v. States Marine
Lines.49 The use of state laws failed to protect federal rights;
therefore, the Supreme Court recognized the propriety of the fed-
eral, as opposed to state, tort remedies in a federally preempted
field and was compelled to direct the lower federal courts to fash-
ion federal tort remedies.5 0 Although the case involved admiralty,
the decision provides persuasive support for the establishment of
federal air crash law because the policies and rationales behind
both are analogous. They are both areas which are of predomi-
nant federal interest in relation to interstate transportation and
the inevitable fatalities which occur therewith.51
44. 504 F.2d at 403 (7th Cir. 1974).
45. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1963).
46. 504 F.2d at 404 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1976)).
47. Kohr, 504 F.2d at 404 (7th Cir. 1974).
48. Id.
49. 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (concerns maritime law). The court overruled the 84
year-old rule derived from Harrisburg v. Richards, 119 U.S. 199 (1886) that only
statutory remedies can be used in wrongful death maritime activities. The claim
of a widow of a longshoreman injured in Florida's waters was removed to federal
district court and dismissed for lack of a state remedy. On appeal the Supreme
Court reversed holding that the federal interest was pervasive and therefore any
remedy for wrongful death must be determined by federal common law, not by a
state statute.
50. Id. at 410.
51. Another approach used by the federal courts using the Federal Aviation
The approaches and remedies fashioned by innovative courts,
although significant, can only provide solutions to the particular
facts involved in any given case. Decisions by courts demonstrate
reluctance to create federal remedies and reveal the limitations of
case law.52 Even the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 itself acknowl-
edges concurrent state remedies; 5 3 thus, nothing short of an
amendment to the act will make federal remedies exclusive. It is
therefore apparent that the federal courts cannot provide the
needed reform in aviation law and that the time has come for
Congress to address this area of federal concern. In so doing, it
must follow the precedents of Moragne and Kohr if a permanent
solution is to be provided.5 4
Act of 1958 as a guide, is the technique of creating "implied remedies." Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics made a warrantless entry into the petitionier's apartment, searched the
apartment, and arrested the petitioner on narcotics charges. All of the acts were
alleged to have been performed without probable cause. The Court concluded
that the petitioner's complaint stated a cause of action under the fourth amend-
ment and that he was entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he suf-
fered as a result of the agents' violation of the amendment. Justice Harlan,
concurring, said: [I]n suits for damages based on violations of federal statutes
lacking any express authorization of a damage remedy, this Court has authorized
such relief where, in its view, damages are necessary to effectuate the congres-
sional policy underpinning the substantive provisions of the statute." Id. at 402.
In other words, if an express federal right has been interferred with (right to safe
air transportation) and damages have resulted from that interference (damages or
death due to negligent pilot), it can be asserted that the deterring effect of provid-
ing a federal remedy on this situation would act to further Congress' underlying
policy of air commerce safety and that thus such remedy should be available. See
Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972), where in considering
the issue of whether a surviving widow could bring an action for wrongful death,
the court held that a violation of a duty imposed by the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 created a cause of action in favor of the one who is injured or damaged by the
death of a person resulting from such a violation. See generally Note, Implying
Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REV. 285 (1963).
52. 500 F. Supp. at 1054.
53. 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976). "Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies." Id.
54. The United States Supreme Court has suggested such legislation in recog-
nizing the limitations of using federal admiralty law to solve aviation litigations.
Justice Stewart reasoned:
It may be, as the petitioners argue, that aviation tort cases should be gov-
erned by uniform substantive and procedural laws, and that such actions
should be heard in the federal courts so as to avoid divergent results and
duplicitous litigation in multi-party cases.... If federal uniformity is the
desired goal with respect to claims arising from aviation accidents, Con-
gress is free under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation applicable to
all such accidents, whether occurring on land or water, and adapted to the
specific characteristics of air commerce.
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 273-74 (1972). See
also Chicago, 500 F. Supp. at 1053.
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V. PROPOSAL H: A DOMESTIC "WARSAW CONVENTION": FEDERAL
LEGISLATION ESTABLISHING MAXIMI!M RECOVERY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY ARISING FROM AN AIR CRASH
A. Legal Background of the Warsaw Convention5 5
Generally speaking, liability in international air transportation
is governed by rules promulgated in an international treaty
known as the Warsaw Convention, to which the United States, al-
though not a sovereignty, adheres pursuant to presidential procla-
mation.58 The rules promulgated are exclusive and take
precedent over national law.5 7 The Convention is concerned with
only limited aspects of private law governing international car-
riage by air. More specifically, it does not deal with the legal ca-
pacities of the parties in a contract, or the form, validity,
cancellation, voiding, violation, and non-execution of a contract.
All of these questions must be dealt with by a court in accordance
with the applicable national law.5 8
The Warsaw Convention was created to promote uniform rules
relating to the international transportation of persons, baggage, or
goods performed by a commercial or hired air carrier.5 9 The rele-
55. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Warsaw Convention, opened for signature, Oct. 12, 1929, 49
Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 875, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (adherence of the United States proclaimed
Oct. 29, 1934); 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976).
56. Id.
57. The provisions of the Warsaw Convention supersede the traditional doc-
trine adhered to in United States and international conflict of laws cases, that the
right and measure of recovery for injuries were governed by the lex loci delecti
doctrine. See Garcia v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 269 App. Div. 287, 55 N.Y.S.2d
317, a'd 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257, remittitur denied 295 N.Y. 981, 68 N.E.2d 59,
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 741 (1946). As to a departure from a strict application of the
lex loci delecti doctrine in the United States, see notes 25, 28, 29 & 31 supra and
accompanying text.
In addition, the Convention overrides and supplants any contrary local law as to
the legality of limiting a carrier's liability. Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 299
N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1954) (international trans-
portation of a U.S.O. entertainer on an aircraft owned by a private corporation was
not transportation performed by the United States government, thereby rendering
the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention inapplicable).
58. See generally Information Control Group v. United Airlines Corp., 73 Cal.
App. 3d 630, 140 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1977) (recognized availability of state remedies
when not inconsistent with purpose of Federal Aviation Act); Nader v. Allegheny
Airlines, 426 U.S. 290 (1976) (action against airline for overbooking); Archibald v.
Pan American Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972) (action by passengers
against airline for overbooking).
59. Landry, Swif Sure and Equitable Recovery-A Developing Concept in In-
ternational Air Law, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 372, 373 (1975).
vant provisions of the Convention relating to liability limitation
are as follows:
ARTICLE 17
The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a pas-
senger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place
on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embark-
ing or disembarking.
ARTICLE 22
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for
each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs (In 1934, ap-
proximately $8,300).... Nevertheless, by special contract the carrier and
the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability .... 60
Since their enactment, the Convention's limitation of liability
provisions have been the center of considerable debate6' due to
the various recovery policies adhered to by the countries who are
parties to the Warsaw Convention. As a result, a conference was
convened in Montreal, Canada, and an interim arrangement
known as the Montreal Agreement was formulated.62
It has been said that the Warsaw Convention treaty, like any
other statute, must be construed reasonably and so as to accom-
plish its purpose. 63 These "purposes" have been interpreted by
various federal district courts and federal courts of appeal to em-
brace the desire of the Convention's signatories to establish a uni-
The quest for uniformity was quite a success story. Today more than one
hundred nations are parties to the Warsaw Con% ention. It is a private law
treaty in the sense that it applies directly to individuals rather than to na-
tions. And Warsaw has become the most widely adopted private law
treaty in the history of mankind.
Id.
60. 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976). Also, the Convention prohibits contractual modifi-
cations for lower amounts, art. 23, 49 Stat. 3000, and the carrier may not avail him-
self of the limitation if plaintiff can show willful misconduct by the air carrier, art.
25, 49 Stat. 3000.
61. For detailed discussion of the history of the Convention, and amendments
thereto, and debate surrounding the limitation provisions, see H. DRION, THE LUa-
TATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAw (1st ed. 1954); L KREINDLER, 1
AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 11.01-11.09 (rev. ed. 1981); Sand, Air Carriers' Limitation
of Liability & Air Passengers' Accident Compensation Under the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 28 J. Am L. & COMM. 260 (1961-62).
62. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol, Hague Protocol, September 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371;
Montreal Agreement, C.A.B. Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (May 19, 1966),
approving Agreement C.A.B. 18,900. Under the Agreement, the majority of interna-
tional air carriers scheduling flights involving the United States agreed to increase
their liability limit to $75,000 per passenger unless the plaintiff could show willful
misconduct on the part of the defendant. Thus, an international carrier is abso-
lutely liable, for up to $75,000 per passenger, unless it can prove negligence on the
part of the passenger, for damages sustained in the event of death or injury of a
passenger, if the accident which caused the damage sustained took place on board
the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking.
63. See note 57 supra.
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form body of world-wide liability rules to govern international
aviation; for such rules to supersede; with respect to international
flights; the scores of differing domestic laws; and for all claims for
damages for personal injuries suffered by a passenger in an acci-
dent, whether physical or mental, to be resolved in one action
under the Convention.6 4
At this time it is relevant to discuss two very important aspects
related to the liability limitations in Articles 17 and 22 of the Con-
vention.65 First, by the wording of Article 17, it is clear that the
limitation on the amount of the recovery imposed by the Warsaw
Convention can be invoked only by a carrier.66 It does not apply
to manufacturers of any equipment being used by a carrier.
Therefore, if it appears that a recovery against the carrier might
be limited by the operation of the Convention, plaintiffs counsel
can and should consider the possibility of joining a noncarrier de-
fendant to an action in order to effect full recovery.6 7 Second, the
64. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 922 (1977)
(when a bomb on the airplane exploded personal representatives, heirs, and next
of kin of nine airline passengers killed bring an action against the corporate of-
ficers of the air carrier); Karfunkel v. Compagnie, 427 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(in an argument wherein it was asserted the enactment of the limitations pre-
scribed by the Convention was unconstitutional, the court determined that the
limitations were applicable under the presidential proclamation which does not re-
quire legislative action to ensure adherence to the treaty); Indemnity Ins. Co. v.
Pan American Airways, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (provision in transpor-
tation contract requiring written notice of claim within 30 days of disaster, death,
or injury); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (with respect to rights reserved to the states, the
treaty-making power is not limited to what may be done by an unaided act of
Congress).
65. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
66. Id.
67. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 states in pertinent part:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service
of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those al-
ready parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the ac-
tion and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a sub-
stantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obli-
gations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the
court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff
but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder
would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed
from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person
limitation imposed by the Convention is not absolute as it allows
unlimited recovery if the plaintiff is able to prove willful miscon-
duct on the part of a defendant air carrier.68
In conclusion, the Warsaw Convention governs air carriers' lia-
bility only against international air carriers and, thus, takes prece-
dent over conflicting national law. The framework of the Warsaw
Convention provides for jurisdiction, remedies, and limitations on
liability regarding international air disasters. As a result, litiga-
tion and recovery are both efficient and final. A similar frame-
work within the United States would accomplish the same ends
on a national level.
B. Proposal for Federal Legislation
For the purposes of self-protection, every sovereign government
possesses the right to control airspace above its territory. Accord-
ingly, each state has the power to regulate the use of its air-
space. 69 However, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 prohibits, with
some exceptions, state or local governments from enacting or en-
forcing any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision re-
lating to rates, routes, or services of any carrier authorized under
the Act to provide interstate transportation. 70 The Act itself,
though, recognizes current remedies existing at common law and
labels its own provisions as additions which are under no circum-
stances to abridge or alter those remedies. 71
as described in subdivision (a) (1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the
court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action
should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the
absent person being thus regarded as indispensible. The factors to be
considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered
in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already par-
ties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment,
by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lesssened
or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence
will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate rem-
edy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 states in pertinent part:
(a) Permissive Joinder. [All persons (and any vessel, cargo, or other
property subject to admiralty process in rem) may be joined in one action
as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending
against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more
of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against
one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.
68. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
69. Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930) (chal-
lenge to a minimum altitude requirement).
70. See note 34 supra.
71. See note 53 supra.
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In light of the above, to establish complete uniformity by way of
a complete body of aviation common law governing the rights and
liabilities of injured parties, Congress should formulate national
legislation to be applied in domestic airline accident litigation.
The framework for the legislation can be found in the Warsaw
Convention, specifically in Article 17 which establishes a cause of
action, and in Article 22, which provides for the limitation of the
carrier's liability.72 The federal cause of action established should
favor any person who suffers injury or loss of property or the per-
sonal representative of any person who suffers death caused by a
wrongful action occurring in air commerce.73
Due to the unjust results in the recovery for injury or death, 74 a
uniform federal liability limitation must be formulated. Other-
wise, recoveries under the present Judicial Panel technique in
aviation litigation will continue to result in some parties obtaining
some recovery, but in states which limit recovery, the recovery
can be severely limited due to the statutory recovery limitation.7"
In view of the existence of such recovery limitations in some
states76 and the fact that the majority of the states do not place
any limitation on recovery,77 it is important that any dollar figure
determined to be the maximum recovery possible not be estab-
lished arbitrarily. In order to arrive at a just sum, consideration
of four federal interests in promoting aviation commerce must be
contemplated. First is the proposition that air carriers be able to
predict their business liability and insure against these risks.
Second, the federal government has an economic interest in the
success of the airline industry, and therefore, the recognition that
catastrophical losses should not be borne by aviation alone is im-
portant. The fact that limitation of liability avoids litigation by fa-
cilitating quick settlements in a period when court calenders are
72. See note 60 supra.
73. Such an idea is in line with previous court decisions. See Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970), overruling Harrisburg v. Richard, 119 U.S.
199 (1886).
74. 2 J. KENNELLY, LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASE CASES, ch. 6 (1st ed.
1968). See also note 4 supra and accompanying text.
75. Consolidation in a federal district court, absent federal preemption, would
not alleviate the various recovery inequities because the court is obligated, after
consolidation, to remand to the original court or when not remanded it must apply
the conflict of laws rule of the state in which the suit was originally brought. 28
U.S.C. 1407(a) (1976). See notes 9 & 16 supra and accompanying text.
76. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
77. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
extremely backlogged is also of interest to the federal govern-
ment. Finally, the need for unification of state laws with respect
to the amount of damages to be paid must be contemplated.78
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, and the discussion sur-
rounding its adoption, is most helpful in establishing a maximum
amount for recovery.7 9 The first task undertaken by the Conven-
tion was to attempt to statistically demonstrate what effect a
lower limit of liability would have on claims.80 Information was
obtained by the Civil Aeronautics Board,81 which clearly showed
that any limit on the liability of air carriers would have an inher-
ent inhibiting effect on a substantial portion of American accident
victims. 82 The average recovery between 1950 and 1964 for a fatal-
ity on a Warsaw case was $6,486 as compared to $38,499 on a non-
Warsaw case, and during the most recent period (1958 through
1964), the average recovery for a fatality in a non-Warsaw case
78. Craig & Alexander, Wrongful Death in Aviation and the Admiralty:
Problems of Federalism, Tempests, and Teapots, 37 J. Am L & CoM. 3, 8 (1971). For
example, because of differing state laws, potential liability cannot be determined
accurately, requiring that insurance premiums be calculated assuming the most
unfavorable circumstances, involving the highest cost for the greatest risk.
79. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
80. The members of the working group were Messrs. John Warner and Peter
Schwarzkopf (CAB), Robert P. Boyle and Charles Peters (FAA), and Leopold
Gotzlinger, Andreas Lowenfeld and Allan Mendelsohn (Department of State). In
addition, Mr. Robert Goodman from the staff on the CAB worked with the group in
collecting and analyzing the economic data and in preparing the tables to be dis-
cussed infra.
81. 49 U.S.C. § 1377 (1976) (hereinafter cited as CAB). Pursuant to its author-
ity under the Aviation Act of 1958, the CAB sent questionnaires to all American
carriers requesting accident listings since January 1, 1958, for the period ending
December 31, 1964.
82. 2 ICAO, SPECIAL ICAO MEETING ON LIMrrS FOR PASSENGERS UNDER THE
WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE HAGUE PROTOCOL 123-26 (1966) (hereinafter cited as
Montreal Proceedings). See note 83 infra and accompanying text.
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had risen to over $52,000.83 It was also learned that the average
83. TABLE I
Passenger recoveries (including both judgments and settlements) in
Warsaw and non-Warsaw fatality cases:
Applicable Number of Total Average per
Year Settlements Settlements Passenger Fatality
25
26
43
3
1
223
1
53
10
8
2
2
14
213
Warsaw
$ 201,529
82,015
276,634
28,088
10,576
11,656
108,700
4,812
405,710
74,700
37,227
12,000
16,600
$ 114000
$1,382,247
Non-Warsaw
$ 8,061
3,154
6,433
8,696
10,576
5,828
4,726
4,812
7,654
7,470
4,653
6,000
8,300
8,142
$6,489
1950 112 $ 1,327,385 $11,852
1951 105 1,506,764 14,350
1953 107 2,493,165 23,301
1954 - - -
1955 122 2,433,345 19,945
1956 85 2,467,980 29,035
1957 43 1,295,064 30,118
1958 112 6,451,351 57,601
1959 161 12,856,984 79,857
1960 184 8,901,610 48,378
1961 105 1,562,397 14,880
1962 117 7,421,849 63,434
1963 114 3,057,079 26,816
1964 23 1,763,000 76,C52
TOTALS 1,452 $55,900,883 $38,499
*2 Montreal Proceedings, supra note 82, at 123-26. See also Lowenfeld & Mendelson,
* The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REV. 497, 554 (1966-67).
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
TOTALS
recovery was by no means as astronomical as some had feared.84
Another task undertaken was an attempt to arrive at a useful
estimate of the economic cost to airlines if a higher limit of liabil-
ity were imposed.85 Although no table of liability insurance rates
existed and insurance companies considered such rates to be the
subject of confidential negotiations, 86 it was essential to get a
meaningful and reliable estimate from the insurance industry it-
self. An agreement was finally reached among carriers which au-
thorized their insurance companies to make available estimates
their liability insurance costs. 8 7 With those figures and the insur-
ance expenses listed by American airlines in their annual reports
to the CAB, it was possible to project the insurance cost for given
amounts of liability.88 Upon completion of the statistical study,
the United States felt confident that it had a valid economic case
84. TABLE H
Levels of Passenger Recovery In Non-Warsaw Fatality Cases
1958-1964
Percent of
Amount of Payment Number of Claims Claims
0 53 6.5
$1-$8,292 194 23.9
8,293-16,583 159 19.5
16,584-33,000 115 14.1
33,001-50,000 54 6.6
50,001-75,000 47 5.8
75,001-100,000 45 5.6
100,001-2000,000 110 13.5
200,001 and up 36 4.4
TOTALS 813 100.0
2 Montreal Proceedings, supra note 82, at 72-173.
85. See generally Hearings on the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1965).
86. Id.
87. See note 98 infra and accompanying text.
88. TABLE I
Liability Insurance Costs
Cost per Thousand
Estimated Percentage Revenue Passenger
Limit of Liability Increase Miles
$ 8,300 - $0.64
16,600 5% 0.68
25,000 9% 0.71
50,000 25% 0.81
75,000 38% 0.91
100,000 48% 0.96
200,000 72% 1.12
2 Montreal Proceedings, supra note 82, at 72-173; see also Lowenfeld and Mendel-
son, supra note 83, at 556. Translating these figures into a specific air journey the
difference between the Warsaw Convention limitation and the desired $100,000
limit was about 96c for a 3,000 mile journey-say New York to London-a trip cost-
ing approximately $225 one-way economy class.
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for the $100,000 limit. For individual victims, the difference would
be very significant, but for the airlines, the impact would be
slight. The third, and perhaps the most difficult problem was de-
veloping a position intertwining liability (possibly absolute) with
a dollar recovery limitation acceptable to all the governments and
agencies involved in the controversy. All recognized the twin
goals of adequate passenger protection and continued national
cooperation.89
The traditional United States position had always been to op-
pose, on principle, any concept that eliminated fault as a basis for
recovery in aviation accident litigation.9O Fault as the basis for
compensation to accident victims was viewed as a necessary pro-
tection for the growth of the airline industry.9 1 Argument and dis-
cussion continued over the philosophy of absolute liability and its
earlier application in aviation law at a time when the industry
was considered "ultrahazardous." 92 However, as discussion con-
tinued, it became clear that commercial aviation could no longer
be considered an ultrahazardous enterprise 93 and the concept of
89. The text of the 1952 Rome Convention appears in 19 J. Am L. & COM. 447
(1952). For a summary of the work of CITEJA in developing the 1933 Convention
and of the later work of the ICAO Legal Committee leading up to the 1952 Conven-
tion, see Brown, The Rome Conventions of 1933 and 1952: Do They Point a Moral?,
28 J. AIR L. & COM. 418 (1962). For the English text of the 1933 Convention, see I
Foreign Rel. U.S. 968-77 (1950). The United States participated in the Rome meet-
ing and signed but never ratified the resulting convention.
90. From the earliest postwar consideration of this convention the United
States vigorously opposed the principle of absolute liability. See, e.g., ICAO Legal
Committee, Minutes and Documents, 4th Sess. 14-15, 175, 224 (1949).
91. Rinck, Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties, 28 J. Am L. &
COM. 405 (1962). The appendix to this article shows that out of 43 countries, only 7,
including the United States, base liability for ground damage on either fault or
presumed fault. The rule in the United States varies state by state, ranging from
presumed to absolute liability by statute. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS 851-
55 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A and note (Tent. Draft Nov. 10,
1964).
92. See Baldwin, Liability for Accidents in Aerial Navigation, 9 MICH. L. REV.
20 (1910). The attitude that the airplane was very dangerous to the public was
based, partly at least, on Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. R. 381 (N.Y. 1872).
As late as 1938, the American Law Institute thought aviation was an ultra-haz-
ardous activity. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520, comment b (1938), states that no
matter how carefully constructed, maintained, and operated, the airplane may
crash, cause injury to persons, structures, and chattels on the ground. The same
idea was expressed in Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 851,
266 N.Y.S. 469, 472 (1933) (action for negligence and trespass against airplane pilot
who crashed into tower).
93. Note, Liability for Aircraft Damages to Ground Occupiers--A Study of
Current Trends in Tort Law, 31 IND. LJ. 63, 64-65 (1955). "Due to the technological
risk distribution between all parties was considered.94
When the Montreal Conference 95 convened, the United States
delegation remained dedicated to the convention system and,
while proposing a limit, whether based on absolute liability or
not, of no less than $100,000 per passenger, expressed the hope
that the Convention would be successful. The $100,000 figure
seemed to make sense, both in economic terms and in terms of
adequate protection.96
The American insurance estimates indicated that a limit of
$100,000 per passenger would make the insurance cost to the air-
lines slightly under one dollar per 1,000 passenger miles, as com-
pared to thirty and forty-five cents per 1,000 passenger miles
under the existing Warsaw limitation. The difference between a
limit of liability at $50,000 and one at $100,000 would be seventeen
cents and between $75,000 and a $100,000 limit, the difference
would be six cents per 1,000 passenger miles.97 Thus, whether the
airlines absorbed the added insurance costs or passed them on to
passengers through a possible increase in fares, the effect on avia-
tion economics would be negligible.
In its quest to resolve the limitation dispute, the Convention
viewed various plans and proposals. For the purposes of this dis-
cussion, the most significant were a British proposal where a pas-
senger would choose between level A, say $33,000 covered by the
airlines existing insurance coverage, and level B, perhaps $100,000
advancements made in the industry and to the commendable safety records com-
piled since World War I, aviation can no longer be said to be an ultra-hazardous
activity." Id. at 64.
94. In short, this concept involves an analysis of who is in the best position to
administer the risk, either by insurance or by loss distribution, so as to involve the
least hardship. See, e.g., Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of
Torts, 72 HARv. L. REv. 401 (1959).
95. Agreement CAB. 18,900 Civil Aeronautics Board Order Approving Agree-
ment, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). Most of the material relevant to this
discussion of the Conference is found in 1 & 2 Montreal Proceedings, supra note
82.
96. See notes 82 & 88 supra. Some countries responded favorably to the
United States proposal. The Swedish representative, for example, thought that a
limit of $100,000 per passenger was not unrealistic and pointed out that his coun-
try's experience with an increase in limits did not automatically carry with it a
substantial rise in average recoveries. The Swiss delegate told the meeting that
the question of limits was not just an economic one, but was a question of simple
justice-whether it was just to hold the airlines responsible for death or injury to
passengers, and if so to what extent. They were prepared to concede that the
level proposed by the United States seemed excessive. If a person were really
worth $100,000, which was hard to imagine, he should take steps to insure himselL
The rest asked why the poorer countries, the poorer airlines, and the poorer trav-
elers should pay for the rich ones. 1 Montreal Proceedings, supra note 82, at 5-23.
97. See note 88 supra.
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with a small premium payable for the latter choice.98 The most
promising suggestion, worked out by Sweden, Germany, New
Zealand, and Jamaica, called for a split level plan, with the higher
limitation set at $74,700 and the lower level set at $58,100. 99 In ad-
dition, the four countries, led by Sweden, made the first proposal
that the issue of fault be eliminated for claims under the Warsaw
Convention, so that, in effect, passengers would receive a guaran-
tee of some recovery, though not necessarily up to the limit, in all
cases.100
For the United States, the four-power proposal had substantial
appeal. It would have enabled the delegation to tell Washington
that in return for its reducing the $100,000 limit, it had obtained a
benefit to claimants in terms of speed and certainty of judgments
and thus probably lower litigation costs. Also, even with the pre-
sumption of liability, the carrier placed the burden of pronounc-
ing some theory suggesting fault on the part of the carrier on the
plaintiff, enabling him to possibly recover more than the maxi-
mum recovery.101 The final outcome of the Montreal Convention
resulted in absolute carrier liability up to $75,000 on all flights in
98. 1 Montreal Proceedings, supra note 82, at 49. The United States' attitude
was one of careful examination of the possibility of a $100,000 recovery. The air-
lines said the scheme was totally impractical in terms of keeping records, and in
any event they were reluctant to have to talk to each passenger about the possibil-
ity of his death just at the time of the ticket sale or boarding the aircraft. In the
end, the British proposal was abandoned by practically all. Another scheme,
known generally as the A-B-C plan, called for a split level liability; however, each
country would have to select the liability level it would adhere to at the time of
adhering to the treaty and if any conflict arose the higher limitation would apply.
I Montreal Proceedings, supra note 82, at 195 (introduced by Argentina, Brazil,
and Columbia). This plan may have been approved but the maximum level the
sponsors could agree to was only $50,000 per passenger. 1 Montreal Proceedings,
supra note 82, at 195.
99. 1 Montreal Proceedings, supra note 82, at 49. A number of other plans
were also discussed, calling, for example, for bilateral negotiations of liability lim-
its. 2 Montreal Proceedings, supra note 82, at 200 (introduced by Denmark). An-
other proposal was for two parallel conventions, one among high and one among
low level countries. 2 Montreal Proceedings, supra note 82, at 208 (introduced by
Ireland).
100. 2 Montreal Proceedings, supra note 82, at 90-91. The Swedish delegate
thought that absolute liability would provide a gain for plaintiffs that might well
induce the United States to accept a lower limit than the one it had proposed.
Elimination of the issue of fault would avoid the need to delay settlement negotia-
tions until accident investigation had been completed, and would greatly speed up
and probably reduce the cost of litigation.
101. See 1 L. KREDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW, §§ 10.01-10.02 (rev. ed. 1981).
and out of the United States.10 2 The legislative history of the War-
saw Convention and two of the plans discussed by the members
of the Montreal Conference 103 serve as guidelines for this propo-
sal. The British plan, which involved a split-level of liability and
required that a premium be paid for the higher liability, 0 4 is help-
ful due to its split-level characteristic.1 05
The other split-level plan which proposed a higher $74,000 limi-
tation and eliminated the issue of fault, 0 6 is the ideal guideline
for a uniform federal proposal. A high and low limit was set. Re-
covery for the lower limit required no showing of fault, while any
higher recovery over the set maximum level required proof by the
plaintiff of some fault on the part of the carrier.10 7 The proposal of
this comment is to establish a split-level of liability limitation on
the air carrier predicated upon the following. The legislatively de-
termined minimum level of liability would be available to all
plaintiffs without regard to the issue of fault on the part of the
carrier. This would, as in the Warsaw Convention, guarantee
some recovery to a plaintiff in all cases. A maximum level should
also be imposed to enable a plaintiff to receive more than the
minimum level, but in no case more than the maximum level, 08 if
he can predicate his claim upon some theory of fault or negli-
gence by the air carrier.
A second section to this proposal would state that the rights
and limitations discussed and proposed be expressly limited to
actions involving the air carrier only. In so doing, actions in tort
and strict liability in tort would be preserved for the plaintiff to
pursue against the manufacturers and suppliers'0 9 whose actions
or lack of action contributed to the damage sustained by the
plaintiff.
Also, a carrier would be able to limit, but not totally frustrate, a
102. Agreement C.A.B. 18,900 Civil Aeronautics Board Order Approving Agree-
ment, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
103. See notes 98 & 99 supra and accompanying text.
104. 1 Montreal Proceedings, supra note 82, at 49. 'See also note 98 supra and
accompanying text.
105. However, any requirement of a payment in excess of the airplane ticket
price, of a premium for higher liability, may not withstand constitutional attack
under a charge of violation of equal protection under the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V states that "[N]o person shall
be ... deprived of life, liberty, property, without due process of law ... ." But
consider possible defense to such action under theory of federal preemption under
the commerce clause in the U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
106. 2 Montreal Proceedings, supra, at 224. See also notes 99 & 100 supra and
accompanying text.
107. 2 Montreal Proceedings, supra note 82, at 224.
108. Some exceptions will be provided for and will be discussed. See notes 112
& 113 infra and accompanying text.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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plaintiff's recovery if the carrier could prove that the plaintiff or
the deceased was in some way responsible, by his or her own neg-
ligence, for the injury or subsequent death suffered. The concept
here is that of comparative negligence. 110 In application, this
would amount to the following: once a carrier established contrib-
utory fault for the injury, such contribution would not be a com-
plete bar to recovery, but would allow any determined recovery to
be reduced in proportion to the degree of negligence attributable
to the plaintiff."'
Lastly, the carrier would be able to avoid all liability if it is able
to prove that it took all measures to avoid the damage which oc-
curred or that it was impossible to take such action.112 The heavy
burden of proof here, to be borne by the defendant air carrier, is
to prove the matter by a preponderance of the evidence.
In conclusion, and in contrast to the textual reading of Article
20(1) of the Warsaw Convention,113 there should be no provision
allowing for private contractual agreements to increase the liabil-
ity limitations between a party and the air carrier. The rationale
is that this proposal promotes uniformity and predictability. If
parties are able to contract for differing liability clauses, carriers
would be significantly burdened with the duty to provide notice of
such availability. In the long run, this would frustrate the federal
policy of predictability because a carrier would not .be ableto ac-
curately contemplate the bargaining power of its passengers. The
concept of uniformity would also be impaired since courts would
have to undertake the exercise of determining the applicable
choice of law rules with respect to the area of contracts. 114 The
confusion now existing in determining the applicable law would
merely be shifted to the area of contractual agreements.
If one were to apply the first and third components of the pro-
posal of this comment to the scenerio put forth in the introduc-
tory section of this paper involving a State A crash being tried in
a federal court in State A, involving plaintiffs from State A, State
110. C. HErr AND C. HEFr, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL, § 1.10-1.70 (rev.
ed. 1978).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (1965).
112. 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976). Article 20(1) provides: "The carrier shall not be lia-
ble if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures."
113. Id.
114. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934). See also RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311, comment d (1934).
B, and State C, the issue of recovery would be determined as fol-
lows. First, all cases involving the crash would be consolidated
into one court for both the pretrial and trial procedures. Each
plaintiff would be entitled to the legislatively determined mini-
mum level of recovery for liability despite the possibility that the
state from which the plaintiff hails has a smaller, larger, or per-
haps no recovery limitation. Equally important, the plaintiff
would be relieved of proving fault on the part of the defendant in
order to receive a recovery. This practice could be contrary to
state law.
Another important point is the concept which allows the de-
fendant to utilize the principles of comparative negligence to re-
duce any recovery by the plaintiff. Assume State A follows
contributory negligence principles which act to defeat any recov-
ery by the plaintiff if he or she is in any manner a contributor to
the damages, and that the plaintiff from State A so contributed to
the damages sustained. Absent this proposal, the plaintiff would
be barred from any recovery against the carrier while State B and
State C plaintiffs would recover. However, if this proposal were
implemented the plaintiff would be able to recover, but only in
proportion to the degree of his contribution to the damages
sustained.
VI. RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION: PROVIDING FOR
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATING A FEDERAL
RECOVERY STATUTE
Limitation of the Multidistrict Panel's power under section
1407115 of transfer actions for only pretrial proceedings should be
reconsidered. Despite the frequency of consolidated dispositions
of common issues in transferee courts, the limitation has created
many practical problems which have prevented realization of the
full benefits available from consolidated handling of multidistrict
litigation. The drafters of section 1407 considered its limitation to
pretrial advisable because of the impracticality of trying a mas-
sive group of cases in one court, the frequent need for local dis-
covery to supplement coordinated discovery, and respect for
plaintiffs' choice of forum. 16 However, the importance of these
considerations were overestimated because, first, trial of complex
common issues in one court is frequently practical and efficient.
As the experience of the Judicial Panel shows, even when the liti-
115. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
116. See Hearings on S. 3815 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements on the Judi-
cial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17
(1966) (testimony of Judge William H. Becker).
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gation is too complicated to be tried all at once, significant effi-
ciencies may nonetheless be achieved by dividing the cases into
closely related groups and trying each group in a separate district.
Second, because cases have tended to be settled either in pretrial
or upon resolution of common issues of liability or patent validity,
local discovery regarding noncommon issues has rarely been nec-
essary. Moreover, when local discovery is required on issues such
as damages, it can just as easily be undertaken after the resolu-
tion of common issues as at the end of pretrial.117 Section 1407
should be revised to establish an exclusive federal procedure al-
lowing the Judicial Panel to transfer a multidistrict litigation to
one court for consolidated pretrial and trial.
Allowing the Judicial Panel to consolidate for all purposes
would enable parties who want a group of similar cases to be
tried in the same court to go directly to the Judicial Panel without
first having to use section 1407118 and other time consuming and
unpredictable devices.119 It would also reduce the attorney and
judicial resources that must be expended to achieve consolidated
dispositions in transferee courts. Finally, it would place the
power to decide all questions of consolidation in the body most
qualified to weigh and uniformily apply the policies involved in
the efficient administration of the federal courts.
To accompany exclusive federal procedure, Congress should,
with the guidance of the federal common law established in the
area of recovery for parties in air crashes, legislate a federal re-
covery statute focusing on the desirability of creating a more com-
117. Id.
118. See note 5 supra.
119. The change of venue provision of the statute reads:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.
(b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit or pro-
ceeding of a civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in
the discretion of the court, from the division in which pending to any other divi-
sion in -the same district. Transfer of proceedings in rem brought by or on behalf
of the United States may be transferred under this section without the consent of
the United States where all other parties request transfer.
(c) A district court may order any civil action to be tried at any place within
the division in which it is pending.
(d) As used in this section, "district court" includes the United States District
Court for the District of the Canal Zone; and "district" includes the territorial ju-
risdiction of that court.
28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976).
plete body of aviation law governing the rights and liabilities of
injured parties. 20 The recognized legislative attempts to enact
comprehensive aviation legislation providing for exclusive federal
jurisdiction over civil damage actions have been unsuccessful due
to congressional unwillingness. to preempt states' predominant in-
terests in protecting its citizens who have been injured in aviation
commerce.
1 21
Nevertheless, despite this opposition, the federal interests in air
commerce provide a strong policy basis for federal preemption in
this area. First, the exercise of common law power when an over-
riding national interest is presented has been partially obviated
by the apparent desire of courts to justify the exercise of this
power by incorporating statutory or constitutional sources in or-
der to "find" the applicable law 22 rather than to allow the power
to stand alone in the federal government. This is not only be-
cause the rights and duties are largely local in nature, but also be-
cause a state might be required to bear the financial burden of a
citizen who is inadequately compensated for a personal injury.
Second, since an aircraft's "airworthiness"' 23 and the qualifica-
tions for pilots and air traffic controllers' 2 4 are subject to federal
control as a part of the government's responsibility for air safety,
the duties and any breach thereof are federal also. However,
mere recognition of the federal interest under the issue of federal
preemption would ignore the important issue of whether the fed-
eral interest is dominent over state interests in applying its law
for recovery in wrongful death actions. Under the same analysis,
the mere existence of a state interest should not override the
need to implement federal policies.
In deciding which interest is to be determined as superior in
120. The action must be of a legislative nature due to the broad language of
Erie which chills significantly a federal court's exercise of its power to formulate
common law, particularly in a diversity case. See note 2 supra.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976) (establishing judicial panel on multi-district liti-
gation and remand requirement); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301
(1976); S. 3305, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1968) ("Holtzoff Bill'); S. 3306, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 1 (1968) ("Admiralty Bill"). See notes 5 & 37 supra and accompanying
text.
122. For two examples of this approach, see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conk-
lin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (action for fraud in the inducement of consulting
agreement); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (federal ques-
tion regarding a promissory note).
123. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1423(c) (1976). For a
comparison with maritime law, see Moragne, note 73 supra, where a unanimous
court held that an action for a death resulting from a vessel's "unseaworthiness" is
maintainable under general maritime law. See Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794,
798-801 (1st Cir. 1974) (citing Moragne, court found a survival action or pain and
suffering).
124. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1422 (1976).
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the field of air commerce, it must be recognized that a state's in-
terest, to whatever degree, is applicable only when its laws are
being applied with respect to one of its citizens, and, as happens
quite often in complex aviation litigation, the conflict of laws anal-
ysis undertaken to determine the state law to be applied can eas-
ily result in the application of laws of a state other than that in
which the citizen is domiciled. In comparison, the overriding fed-
eral interest in promoting aviation commerce necessarily involves
the proposition that air carriers should be able to predict business
liability.125 It appears that a liability limitation such :as the one
proposed by this comment would enable the air carriers to attract
capital investors by dispelling fears that a carrier could be
financially destroyed by a single catastrophic accident. 126 The
natural result would be an economically healthier domestic air
transportation system. Thus, any state interest is slight compared
with the dominant federal interest in the application of a uniform
federal rule of recovery.
Because the state policies in aviation law area are contrary to
federal interests, the state law cannot be brought within the goals
of the federal law. Under a strict supremacy clause analysis,
rooted in the existing federal preemption in the field of aviation
commerce, a legislatively implemented liability limitation would
prevail over the current judicial exercise of subjecting an air car-
rier to the differing laws of the many states because federal law is
held to be superior to state law.12 7
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to reveal the inadequacies and inequi-
125. It should not be forgotten that the proposal in this comment suggests that
the parties not be permitted to privately contract a higher limitation on liability
like the provision in Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention. This would be
known to both parties, which would allow the carrier to predict with great cer-
tainty what its business liability would be.
See Comment, Action Against International Air Carriers: The Inapplicability of
California's Wrongful Death Law, 12 PAC. L.J. 147 (1980), criticizing the court's in-
terpretation of Article 22(1) in In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114,
1126 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
126. See, e.g., Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 410 (1978); L.
KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01 (rev. ed. 1981); A. LOWENFELD, AVIA-
TION LAW ch. VI, §§ 26, 27 (reprinted 1977).
127. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942) (power over external af-
fairs not shared by states, but rather, is vested exclusively in national gov-
ernment).
ties involved in the current procedures surrounding aviation liti-
gation and to impress upon the reader the need for providing
exclusive federal jurisdiction and federal procedures in this area.
The implementation and adoption of such would result in a reduc-
tion in time and resources expended by attorneys and judges, and
greater uniformity in gaining access to federal courts. Further-
more, to correct the inequities inherent in aviation recovery, a
federal recovery statute needs to be adopted. The statute should
include a liability limitation applicable in domestic aviation litiga-
tion which would create uniformity and predictability in aviation
recovery.
DEBORAH J. OLSEN
